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A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF PREDATORY LENDING 
Patricia A. McCoy* 
To the dispassionate observer, predatory lending presents a 
conundrum.1  Its victims are homeowners who are wedded to staying in 
their homes.  Many of them, particularly the elderly, have minuscule 
mortgages or own their homes free and clear.  Nevertheless, these 
homeowners sign seemingly irrational loan contracts that are structured 
to result in financial ruin in the form of impaired credit, bankruptcy, or 
foreclosure.2 
Understanding why this happens has key public policy implications 
for the debate over predatory lending.  Are affected borrowers rational 
economic actors who maximize expected utility when signing loan 
contracts that later are disputed?  Or rather, do predatory lenders induce 
sub-optimal decisions by homeowners by exploiting anomalies in 
consumer behavior through marketing?  Insights from behavioral 
economics indicate the latter.   
This essay considers experimental evidence from behavioral 
economics can shed light on injured borrowers’ decisionmaking 
processes and the choice of legal redress.  Specifically, I posit that 
predatory lenders exploit the behavioral principle of framing effects to 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.  My thanks to Peter Diamond, Kathleen Engel, 
Botond Köszegi, Jim Rebitzer, and Elizabeth Renuart for their insights.  This work first appeared in 
an expanded version as Predatory Lending Practices: Definition and Behavioral Implications, in 
WHY THE POOR PAY MORE: HOW TO STOP PREDATORY LENDING 81 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 
2004). 
 1. In the home mortgage market, predatory lending is a syndrome of exploitative loan terms 
or practices that involves one or more of the following six problems: (1) loans structured to result in 
seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers; (2) rent seeking that is harmful to borrowers; (3) 
loans involving fraud or deceptive practices; (4) other instances of lack of transparency in loans that 
are not actionable as fraud; (5) loans that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress; 
and/or (6) servicing abuses.  Predatory lending is generally found in the subprime market, which 
caters to borrowers with blemished credit.  See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of 
Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1259-70 
(2002).  See also Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage Servicers, 15 
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 753, 756-61 (2004). 
 2. Engel & McCoy, supra note 1, at 1260. 
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manipulate homeowners’ otherwise strong aversion to losing their 
homes to foreclosure.  Through clever marketing, distraction, and an 
often legal lack of transparency concerning the true risks involved, 
predatory lenders are able to divert the focus of homeowners from the 
fear of losing their homes to other fears, many of which are often 
conducive to less destructive solutions. 
In debates over predatory lending, those who oppose government 
intervention argue that aggrieved subprime borrowers should live by the 
bargains they strike.  Such critics maintain that those borrowers are 
rational actors who knowingly and freely consent to the terms in their 
contracts. 
Evidence from the new and evolving field of behavioral economics, 
however, suggests that this portrait of subprime borrowers misses the 
mark.  In fact, borrowers often bring cognitive biases to the table that 
lenders exploit through clever marketing to manipulate them into signing 
abusive loan agreements, in violation of strong personal preferences to 
remain in their homes.  The remainder of this essay examines evidence 
for that proposition and considers the public policy implications. 
I.  BACKGROUND: EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY AND ITS CRITIQUE  
The rational actor assumption is grounded in expected utility 
theory, which has been the classic paradigm for decision-making under 
uncertainty for a half-decade or more.  Neo-classical economics assumes 
that reasonable people seek to follow expected utility theory and that 
most of them actually do so.3 
Despite its prominence, expected utility theory does not derive from 
empirical fact.  Rather, expected utility theory reduces the complexities 
of human decision-making to the following mathematical formula for 
determining the overall utility (U) of a prospect: 
 
U (x1, p1; . . . ; xn, pn) = Σ piu(xi)  =  p1 u(x1) + . . . + pn u(xn) 
 
where (x1, p1; . . . ; xn, pn) is a risky prospect having possible outcomes    
xi, {i = 1, 2, 3, . . ., n}, each with probability pi, p1 + . . . + pn = 1, and 
u(·) is the utility the consumer would derive from outcome xi.
4  Expected 
utility theory posits that consumers prefer the prospect with the highest 
 
 3. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA  263, 263  (1979). 
 4. Id. at 263-64. 
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expected utility.5  Under that theory, consumers are said to be concerned 
with their final state of wealth, not with gains or losses.6 
II.  THE CRITIQUE OF EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY AND LOSS AVERSION 
Skeptics have long complained that expected utility theory is 
normative in nature, not necessarily descriptive, and eventually set out to 
prove it.  Starting in the 1970s, psychologists and economists began to 
document anomalies in consumer behavior that violated expected utility 
theory.  Experiments by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky, for instance, demonstrate that when certain loss is a possible 
outcome, people are concerned with avoiding the certain loss instead of 
their final state of wealth.   
For example, when people were asked to choose between an 80 
percent chance of losing $4,000 or a certain loss of $3,000, the majority 
of the subjects preferred the 80 percent gamble on losing $4,000 to 
losing $3,000 for sure.7  The desire to avoid a loss led the subjects to 
overweight the certain outcome – losing $3,000 – and to opt for the risky 
choice, despite a bigger expected loss (0.8 x -$4,000 = -$3,200).8  
Conversely, when subjects were asked to choose between an 80 percent 
chance of winning $4,000 or a certain win of $3,000, the majority of 
subjects preferred the sure gain of $3,000 to an expected but risky gain 
of $3,200.9 
Based on these and similar experiments, Kahneman and Tversky 
hypothesize that people overweight the probability of some events and 
underweight others, depending on whether they are confronting possible 
gains or losses.10  In addition, these results suggest that people are so 
loss-averse that they will take substantial risks to avoid losses, even if 
their total expected wealth is less as a result.11  This theory, known as 
prospect theory, is an attempt to explain these phenomena.12 
 
 5. Id. at 264. 
 6. Id.  See also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI.  453, 453 (1981). 
 7. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 3, at 266. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 264, 268-69, 274. 
 10. Id. at 274. 
 11. Id. at 275. 
 12. Kahneman and Tversky express prospect theory in mathematical terms by altering the 
formula for expected utility to add a value function v(·) on gains and losses, plus decision weights 
Π (·) on stated probabilities.  The value function v(·) expresses the idea that people put greater value 
on avoiding losses than on making gains.  The decision weights Π (·) capture the idea that people 
overweight outcomes with low probabilities and underweight outcomes with moderate and high 
3
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Prospect theory has several important principles with implications 
for predatory lending.  The first principle is loss aversion.  Loss aversion 
drives consumer behavior in a number of ways.  As the experiments just 
discussed suggest, loss aversion is why people take substantial risks to 
avoid certain losses.13  Similarly, loss aversion causes people to focus on 
minimizing out-of-pocket expenses, rather than on opportunity costs.14  
The reason for this is that “[f]oregone gains are less painful than 
perceived losses.”15  Finally, when people face potential outcomes that 
entail both gains and losses, loss aversion causes them to prefer 
combining smaller losses with larger gains.16  This outcome is attractive 
because the outcome is perceived as a net gain.17 
In the home mortgage context, loss aversion is apparent in the 
strong aversion that homeowners normally have to losing their homes.  
Thus, Kahneman and Tversky note: “an individual’s aversion to losses 
may increase sharply near the loss that would compel him to sell his 
house . . . .”18  This intense aversion to losing one’s home is suggested 
by data showing that homeowners are seven times less likely to file for 
bankruptcy than people who do not own homes.19  Similarly, among 
people who do file for bankruptcy, homeownership makes them more 
likely to file for protection under the workout provisions of Chapter 13, 
instead of under the liquidation provisions of Chapter 7, specifically in 
order to save their homes.20 
The bankruptcy data provide valuable insights into the preference 
ordering of the average homeowner.  Homeowners prefer to make other 
financial sacrifices to taking the risk of bankruptcy and of losing their 
homes.  If debts do force homeowners into bankruptcy, they prefer to 
 
probabilities.  This results in the following equation expressing the decision-making process that 
loss-averse people are said to employ: 
V = Π (p)v(x) + Π (q)v(y) 
where p and q are probabilities and x and y are competing choices.  Kahneman & Tversky, supra 
note 3, at 275-76.  See also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing 
of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S257 (1986); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 6, at 454. 
 13. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 3, at 264, 268-69, 274. 
 14. Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status 
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 203 (1991). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI. 199, 
202 (1985). 
 17. Id.  See also Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION 
MAKING 183, 187 (1999). 
 18. Kahneman &Tversky, supra note 3, at 278-79. 
 19. Ian Domowitz & Robert L. Sartain, Determinants of the Consumer Bankruptcy Decision, 
54 J. FIN. 403, 413 (1999). 
 20. Id. at 410. 
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remain homeowners and reschedule their debts under Chapter 13, to 
losing their homes but obtaining total debt forgiveness under Chapter 7. 
Given the strong loss aversion associated with homeownership, one 
would expect homeowners to make financial sacrifices or delay paying 
other bills in order to save their homes instead of sacrificing their homes 
to pay off other debts.  Loss-averse homeowners should be highly 
reluctant to enter into loan transactions that threaten their future 
homeownership.  Yet numerous subprime borrowers do precisely that.  
The answer to this paradox lies in how predatory lenders frame their 
sales pitches in order to manipulate the preference ordering of 
homeowners, as I now discuss. 
III.  REFERENCE DEPENDENCE AND FRAMING EFFECTS 
Consumers do not evaluate gains and losses in the abstract.  
Instead, consumers evaluate their options in relation to some reference 
point, a phenomenon known as reference dependence.21  Imagine that 
someone has a choice between A, where she has less of good X and more 
of good Y, and D, where she has more of good X and less of good Y.22  If 
her reference point is B, she will regard the choice as a choice between 
two losses, while if her reference point is C, she will regard it as a choice 
between two gains.23  From either reference point A’ or D’, she will view 
it as a choice between mixtures of different proportions of two desirable 
goods.24  
                                      
 
 
 21. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, supra note 17, at 185.  See also Tversky & 
Kahneman, supra note 12, at S258. 
 22. See Kahneman et al., supra note 14, at 199-200. 
 23. See id. at 200. 
 24. Id. 
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       In many cases, the reference point is not fixed, but can be 
manipulated depending on how the choice is framed.  Marketers shift 
reference points by relabeling and thus framing possible outcomes, 
which can then shape consumers’ responses.  Predatory lenders exploit 
this ability to frame borrowers’ reference points.  This is why reference 
dependence and framing effects are such important concepts in thinking 
about predatory lending. 
As the following experiment illustrates, people make different 
choices about identical outcomes, depending on whether the outcomes 
are framed as gains or losses.  In the experiment, people were divided 
into two groups and were given different scenarios that involved 
choosing between two options.  All of the choices would make the 
subjects $400 richer, but for one group the choices were framed as gains 
and for the other as losses: 
 
Scenario A  Assume yourself richer by $300 than you are today.      
You have to choose between: a sure gain of $100 or a 50% chance to 
gain $200 and a 50% chance to gain nothing 
 
Scenario B  Assume yourself richer by $500 than you are today.   
You have to choose between:  a sure loss of $100 or a 50% chance to 
lose nothing and a 50% chance to lose $200 
 
 In Scenario A, of 126 people surveyed, 72 percent chose a sure gain 
of $100 and 28 percent chose the 50/50 wager.25  In Scenario B, of 128 
people surveyed, only 36 percent chose the sure loss of $100, while 64 
percent chose the 50/50 wager.26 
As this experiment shows, whether people were risk-loving or risk-
averse depended on whether the outcomes were framed as gains or 
losses.27  When the choice was framed as a gain, a majority became 
averse to uncertainty and chose the sure gain.  But when the choice was 
framed as a loss, a majority sought to avoid the certain loss and chose 
uncertainty.  A majority behaved inconsistently, even though they would 
become $400 richer no matter what choice they made.  Framing dictated 
whether the majority was risk-loving or risk-averse, again contradicting 
expected utility theory.28 
Framing creates an illusion that can induce inconsistent and 
 
 25. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 12, at S258. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at S259. 
 28. Id. 
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sometimes irrational consumer decisions.  This illusion arises when two 
different statements of a choice are logically equivalent but not 
transparently equivalent.29  Normally, consumers are not conscious of 
alternate ways of framing decisions or of the psychological effects of 
different frames.30  Thus, how a decision is framed can manipulate and 
momentarily shift the order of a homeowner’s preferences.31 
Framing is the alchemy that permits predatory lenders to 
manipulate the order of homeowners’ preferences and overcome their 
otherwise strong aversion to losing their homes.  In reality, predatory 
loans are highly likely to result in losses, in the form of staggering debt, 
lost home equity, and possible foreclosure.  Yet lenders never frame 
predatory mortgages in terms of major expected losses.  One never sees 
ads saying: “Take $20,000 today in exchange for a 50 percent chance 
that, in two years’ time, you will lose your $50,000 home.”  Such a 
marketing strategy would unleash loss aversion of profound proportions. 
Instead, predatory lenders go to extreme lengths to frame their 
loans as gains and to obscure potential losses.  Gains are portrayed not 
only as fast cash, but also as fast cash in the tens of thousands of dollars.  
Losses, on the other hand, are obscured by depicting them as initial 
monthly payments that are manageable in size.  Lenders manipulate loan 
terms through legal means to give the appearance of reasonable monthly 
payments.  They do this through initial teaser rates, extended loan 
maturities, balloon clauses, and adjustable rate mortgages.32  Left unsaid, 
or buried in fine print, is the fact that predatory loans are high-stakes 
ventures, with potential catastrophe looming down the road.  The effect 
is to create the impression of huge, immediate gains offsetting small, 
eventual losses. 
This key principle of framing—offsetting small perceived losses 
with the illusion of substantial gains33—is particularly seductive to 
 
 29. Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11, 36 (1998). 
 30. See Stephen E.G. Lea et al., THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE ECONOMY: A TEXTBOOK OF 
ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY 347 (1987).  See also Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 6, at 453, 457-58; 
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 12, at S260. 
 31. See Rabin, supra note 29, at 37.  The related literature on preference reversals explores 
situations where different methods of elicitation lead to systematically different orderings of 
preferences.  See id.; Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein, Preference Reversals: A Broader 
Perspective, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 596, 599-603 (1983); Amos Tversky et al., The Causes of 
Preference Reversal, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 204, 214-15 (1990); Amos Tversky & Richard H. Thaler, 
Anomalies: Preference Reversals, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 201, 202 (1990). 
 32. Customers are less resistant to price increases when those increases are couched as 
cancellation of temporary discounts such as teaser rates.  Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 12, at 
S261. 
 33. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 3, at 287; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 6, at 
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homeowners who are in financial straits but have significant home 
equity.  To homeowners desperate for lifesaving medical care, a car that 
works, roof repairs, or relief from bill collectors, lenders can easily shift 
their reference point from continued enjoyment of their homes to the 
creditors at the door.  Despite pressing financial problems, most such 
homeowners – if asked – would prefer a solution that would allow them 
to stay in their homes. At a minimum, if the choice were put to them 
openly, most homeowners would delay paying other debts to losing their 
homes. 
Nevertheless, subprime marketing can manipulate a temporary 
preference shift in debt-ridden homeowners by focusing a spotlight on 
their immediate financial problems while obscuring the eventual threat 
to their ownership of their homes.  That is why predatory lenders 
pinpoint homeowners in crisis and promise to erase their debts with 
offers of instant cash.  There are numerous ways to identify distressed 
homeowners.  Predatory lenders monitor people’s credit reports for debt 
problems, buy lists of delinquent debtors from debt collectors, and drive 
through neighborhoods looking for decrepit roofs and porches.  At city 
halls, registries, and courthouses, they check filings daily for building 
code violations, tax liens, collection cases, divorce summonses, and 
mortgage payoffs.  Lenders flush out likely victims with door-to-door 
sales and aggressive telemarketing campaigns.  They use Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act data to target low-income minority 
neighborhoods where Hispanics and African-Americans historically 
have been redlined and have lost hope of qualifying for home loans.34  
Then they target homeowners who appear in the crosshairs with a sales 
pitch.  With a knock on the door or a phone call, the lenders 
miraculously appear and offer to wipe away the homeowners’ financial 
difficulties with the illusion of large gains from a new loan. 
IV.  LACK OF TRANSPARENCY 
Framing effects can occur when choices that are logically 
equivalent are not transparent.35  In an experiment, Kahneman and 
Tversky examined decision-making anomalies that can result from lack 
of transparency.  They asked 150 people: 
Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions.  
 
456. 
 34. See Departments of the Treasury & Housing and Urban Development, Curbing Predatory 
Home Mortgage Lending 39 (June 20, 2002); Engel & McCoy, supra note 1, at 1281-84. 
 35. Rabin, supra note 29, at 36. 
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First examine both decisions, then indicate the options you prefer. 
 
Decision (1) Choose between: 
A.  a sure gain of $240 
B.  a 25% chance to win $1,000 and a 75% chance to gain nothing. 
 
Decision (2) Choose between: 
C.  a sure loss of $750 
D.  a 75% chance to lose $1,000 and a 25% chance to lose nothing. 
 
In Decision (1), 84 percent chose A and 16 percent chose B, while 
in Decision (2), 13 percent chose C and 87 percent chose D.36  In effect, 
an overwhelming majority preferred A & D to B & C.37  However, the 
combined expected value of B & C exceeds that of A & D, making B & 
C the rational choice: 
 
B & C: The expected value equals (0.25 x $1,000) - 750 = -$500 
A & D: The expected value equals $240 + (-0.75 x $1,000) = -$510 
 
When the options were presented transparently, people invariably 
chose B & C.38  But when the options were presented in the obscure 
format of the problem posed above, 73 percent of the people chose 
combination A & D and only 3 percent of them chose the rational 
combination B & C.39 
This suggests that when the information people receive is confusing 
or difficult to evaluate, they cannot recognize the choice with the highest 
expected utility.40  Thus, consumer choice depends not only on loss 
aversion, but also on transparency.41 
Predatory lenders have multiple tools to defeat transparency.  One 
technique involves search.  A key objective of predatory lenders is to 
prevent homeowners, once solicited for loans, from engaging in 
comparison-shopping.  This is one reason why predatory lenders 
generally focus on the refinance market, not the purchase-money 
market.42  In the purchase money market, individuals are actively 
 
 36. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 12, at S255-56. 
 37. Id. at S256. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 12, at S265-66. 
 40. See id. at S265. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Departments of the Treasury & Housing and Urban Development, supra note 34, at 
30-31. 
9
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shopping for credit.  In the refinance market, numerous homeowners 
who could refinance are not seeking to do so43 and those are the people 
whom predatory lenders target.  Once vulnerable prospects are 
identified, lenders aim to immediately lock them in psychologically.  
Rapid loan approval is key.  So are high-pressure closings.  By 
accelerating the loan process, lenders reduce the chance that borrowers 
will comparison-shop, making it easier for lenders to insert exploitative 
terms into loans.  Finally, lenders carefully study homeowners’ debt 
profiles to devise how to manufacture a sudden urge for a loan in 
homeowners who before had none. 
In the rare cases when homeowners shop for subprime loans, their 
search is unlikely to be informative. Unlike the prime mortgage market, 
subprime quotes by different lenders are almost never posted side-by-
side and when they are, the quotes do not permit meaningful 
comparison.  It is well known that subprime interest rates go up as FICO 
scores go down.44  Subprime loans are not advertised that way, however, 
and it is impossible for loan applicants to compare subprime loans based 
on FICO scores.45  Similarly, subprime mortgage loans do not have 
standardized cost terms that permit easy comparison.  One may have a 
prepayment penalty for three years, another for five.46  One may offer 
single-premium credit life insurance, another may limit credit life 
policies to monthly premiums.47  Under TILA, numerous cost elements 
can be excluded from the APR, hampering comparison-shopping.48  
Even when APRs are comparable, some lenders intentionally tell 
borrowers that only the nominal interest rate matters, not the APR.49  
Finally, lenders generally have no obligation to inform borrowers of 
alternative sources of credit or to advise them to get credit counseling or 
 
 43. See Glenn Canner et al., Mortgage Refinancing in 2001 and Early 2002, 88 FED. RES. 
BULL. 469, 470 (2002). 
 44. See, e.g., Departments of the Treasury & Housing and Urban Development, supra note 
34, at 28, 33-34; Alan M. White, Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing: Present and Future Research, 15 
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 503, 506 (2004). 
 45. See White, supra note 44, at 509.  Cf. Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 
supra note 16, at 209-11. 
 46. White, supra note 44, at 514-15.  
 47. See Patrick McGeehan, Another Lender to Stop Sales Of Single-Premium Coverage, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 12, 2001, at C9. 
 48. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1646, 1665a (2005) (including TILA provisions regarding 
disclosure of annual percentage rates). 
 49. See, e.g., In re First Alliance Mortgage Company, 298 B.R. 652, 657 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
2003) (noting that loan officers, following a company script, told unsuspecting homeowners that the 
“interest rate is what consumers care about, APR is what the federal government cares about and 
yield is what the banks care about in evaluating a loan”). 
10
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legal advice before proceeding to closing. 
V.  LACK OF EXPERIENCE 
Predatory lenders purposefully target inexperienced borrowers who 
have not had prior opportunities for meaningful feedback regarding 
subprime refinance loans.  Approximately 51 percent of homeowners 
have never refinanced their mortgages.50  Subprime borrowers, many of 
whom historically have been credit-constrained, are even less likely than 
prime borrowers to have refinanced.  In addition, because subprime 
borrowers are less well educated on average than prime borrowers, they 
are more apt to be confused by subprime loan terms and the intricacies 
of the subprime mortgage process.51 
Predatory lenders capitalize on this lack of education and 
experience to lock borrowers into products that they do not understand 
and cannot afford.52  Once locked in, borrowers who cannot keep up 
with the monthly payments find few, if any, avenues of relief.  
Struggling borrowers would like to refinance on better terms, but their 
worsening financial conditions make them unpalatable to other lenders.  
With each late payment, their credit scores sink.  Many become victims 
of repeated loan flipping, and with each loan “flip,” their loans mature 
later and have other, new abusive terms.  Eventually, large prepayment 
penalties, interest arrears, and late fees strip their equity and, when 
combined with the outstanding principal, their indebtedness may exceed 
the value of their homes.  The borrowers become locked into desperate 
situations and cannot get out.53 
VI.  CHOICE HEURISTICS AND ERRORS IN ESTIMATING PROBABILITIES 
All consumers, including subprime customers, use heuristic 
principles of one sort or another to simplify their financial decisions.54  
When these principles are sound, they provide a useful shortcut to 
financial decision-making.55  Other choice heuristics, however, can lead 
 
 50. Canner et al., supra note 43, at 470. 
 51. See Departments of the Treasury & Housing and Urban Development, supra note 34, at 
37.  See also Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV.  233, 234-35 (2002). 
 52. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 1, at 1281-83. 
 53. Id. at 1263, 1281. 
 54. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974). 
 55. Id. 
11
McCoy: A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
MCCOY1.DOC 5/2/2005  8:58:17 AM 
736 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:725 
to grave and systematic errors in weighing risks and benefits.56 
At least three choice heuristics lead homeowners to make bad 
choices when considering subprime mortgages.  The first is the relative 
insensitivity of subprime customers to interest rate levels in general and 
annual percentage rates.  These individuals tend to focus on whether the 
monthly payments offered are affordable, rather than on lower interest 
rates.57  Pessimistic about whether other lenders would be willing to lend 
to them and fearful that the loan at hand will vanish, these borrowers 
jump at the first option offered as long as the payments seem feasible.  
Predatory lenders exploit that tendency by using long maturities, teaser 
rates, balloon clauses, and sometimes fraud to advertise low monthly 
payments on high-cost loans. 
Two additional choice heuristics cause homeowners to make 
mistaken probability assessments.  First, repeated studies have shown 
that people tend to overestimate the probability of compound events.58  
In order for a mortgage to be paid off successfully, a borrower must 
make on-time payments every month for up to thirty years.  One missed 
payment can be enough to throw the loan into default.  Under basic 
principles of probability, the longer the loan term and the greater the 
number of scheduled monthly payments, the more likely it is that the 
loan will go into default.  Nevertheless, people tend to equate the 
likelihood of making the first mortgage payment — which is higher — 
with the likelihood of successfully paying off the entire loan.  The less 
likely default seems, the more likely homeowners are to disregard the 
potential loss of their homes.59 
The last choice heuristic sheds light on the heightened propensity of 
subprime customers to buy credit life insurance and other, related 
insurance products at inflated prices.  Experimental evidence reveals that 
people are willing to pay more to insure against vivid, catastrophic risks 
having low probability than more general risks.60  In one survey, for 
example, subjects were willing to pay more for life insurance for death 
on an airplane flight due to terrorism than for death on a flight for any 
reason.61  Thus, while predatory lending victims underestimate the risk 
 
 56. Id.  
 57. George S. Day & William K. Brandt, Consumer Research and the Evaluation of 
Information Disclosure Requirements: The Case of Truth in Lending, 1 J. CONSUMER RES. 21, 22-
23 (1974). 
 58. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 54, at 1129. 
 59. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 3, at 275. 
 60. See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance 
Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 39 (1993). 
 61. Id. 
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of default in general, they may overestimate the risk of default due to 
isolated risks such as death or disability and accordingly overpay for 
insurance for those risks. 
VII.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Predatory lending has a certain perverse genius.  That genius lies in 
targeting cognitive anomalies in financial decision-making by 
individuals and masterminding marketing techniques to exploit those 
anomalies, all leading to disastrous effects for borrowers.  Predatory 
lenders make attractive terms salient and obscure terms that might pose 
concern.  They hunt down homeowners in financial straits and capitalize 
on the desperation that fuels risk-taking to snare their assent.  They give 
a hard sell on credit life insurance, knowing that people will overpay for 
it. They do everything in their power to impede comparison-shopping by 
homeowners.  And, all too often, they perpetrate fraud on victims. 
These marketing techniques of predatory lenders have distinct 
public policy implications.  Improved disclosure, for example, is often 
touted as the optimal remedy.  However, it is hard to imagine Congress 
mandating a disclosure scheme so starkly plain that victims would turn 
down abusive, irrational loans.  To do that, Congress would essentially 
have to mandate upfront marketing pitches of the form, “If you sign this 
loan, you will have w % chance of damage to your credit record, x % 
chance of going into default, y % chance of bankruptcy, and z % chance 
of losing your home to foreclosure.”  All subprime advertising would 
have to be heavily regulated for content, to prevent undermining that 
core message.  All other marketing, including oral pitches, would have 
to be strictly limited. 
Under the Securities Act of 1933, advertising is heavily regulated in 
just that manner for the sale of public securities offerings.62  Given the 
current political climate and the lobbying prowess of the mortgage 
industry, however, it is impossible to imagine Congress enacting similar 
advertising restrictions for the subprime mortgage industry today. 
There is a further problem with disclosure, which is that disclosure 
fails to address the separate and thorny issue of intentionally targeting 
susceptible victims.  To people already in dire straits, if lenders frame 
the only choice as a predatory loan or no loan at all – to the exclusion of 
other, more appropriate options such as government-subsidized home 
repair loans, home equity lines of credit or unsecured loans from 
 
 62. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2005) (regulating what information has to be disclosed in the 
prospectus of a registered security). 
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reputable lenders – disclosures of the form outlined above are unlikely to 
deter potential victims from bad decisions.  In recognition of this 
problem in the boiler-room securities sales context, securities regulators 
have mandated not only disclosures, but also more stringent measures, 
including a duty of suitability.63 
Another remedy often touted is homeowner education and/or 
counseling.  In the long run, it is doubtful that sufficient financial 
resources would ever be devoted to effective nationwide counseling.  
More to the point, at a minimum, as Kahneman and Tversky pointed out, 
“[e]ffective  learning . . . requires accurate and immediate feedback 
about the relation between the situational conditions and the appropriate 
response.”64  For the reasons discussed earlier, mortgage lending, 
particularly predatory mortgage lending, does not lend itself to accurate 
and immediate feedback or to opportunities for corrective action.65  
Homeowner education in advance of marketing pitches by lenders is too 
early.  Neutral homeowner counseling before an application is signed 
has the virtue of immediacy, but there are no good faith estimates of 
closing costs (GFEs) or concrete loan documents available yet for 
review.  Without that information, it is difficult to counteract impulsive 
decisions by people in financial exigency, especially when the lenders 
are touting the virtues of the loans.  While it is true that lenders are 
supposed to give applicants a GFE within three days after signing their 
loan applications, GFEs lack interest rates and finance charges and many 
lenders never deliver GFEs anyway.  Homeowner counseling right at 
closing (or during the three-day TILA rescission period afterward) 
would have the potential benefit of access to HUD-1s and loan 
documents, but would face an uphill struggle to educate homeowners 
who are thirsting for their loan proceeds and who have already paid non-
refundable application fees. 
Homeowner education and counseling further assumes that 
cognitive anomalies can be eradicated.  However, there is increasing 
evidence that experience and learning do not succeed in eliminating 
cognitive biases or improve people’s ability to apply the principles they 
learn to specific situations.66 
Finally, disclosure, education and counseling ignore the crucial fact 
that predatory lending is the product of relentless and fiendishly clever 
marketing that manipulates cognitive imperfections.  Predatory lenders 
 
 63. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 1, at 1325-26. 
 64. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 12, at S274. 
 65. See supra Section V. 
 66. See Rabin, supra note 29, at 31. 
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will always be better at reaching potential victims than legitimate 
lenders, community groups, churches, and the government.  In large part 
that is because vulnerable customers often are not actively in the market 
for loans to begin with.  As a result, the best way to pinpoint them is 
labor-intensive and costly: by mimicking predatory lenders and going 
door-to-door.  Due to the high costs involved, reaching the potential 
victims of predatory lending thus presents an enormous hurdle for any 
educational campaign.67 
In the analogous context of insurance, Eric Johnson and his 
colleagues conclude that the “recognition that consumer perceptions and 
decision processes are imperfect and manipulable . . . support[s] 
insurance regulation and prohibition of certain types of insurance.”68  
Likewise, Kahneman and Tversky argue that framing places ethical 
duties on the marketer: “When framing influences the experience of 
consequences, the adoption of a decision frame is an ethically significant 
act.”69  Particularly here, since predatory lenders and brokers can obviate 
the harm more cheaply than the victims, the onus should fall on the 
purveyors of predatory loans. 
In the securities context, identical considerations caused the 
Securities and Exchange Commission long ago to impose a duty of 
suitability on securities brokers.  Under that duty, securities brokers must 
refrain from recommending securities that are unsuitable, given an 
individual customer’s financial status, needs and goals. 70 
The time has come for a comparable duty of suitability in subprime 
lending, one that is tailored to the realities of the subprime market.  Such 
a duty would put the burden of preventing predatory lending on those 
who can afford it most cheaply (i.e., predatory lenders and brokers) by 
empowering the federal government and individual victims to sue for 
loan reformation, disgorgement, and damages.71 
 
 67. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 1, at 1309. 
 68. Johnson et al., supra note 60, at 36. 
 69. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 6, at 458. 
 70. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 1, at 1318. 
 71. Id. at 1339-56. 
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